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The Constitution’s promise 
 
Under colonialism and apartheid, millions of people were dispossessed of their land and 
livelihoods. The Constitution was written with the aspiration to restore to people some of 
what they lost. Section 25 (6) and (9) of the Constitution instructs the government to adopt 
legislation that will realise the right to security of land tenure or comparable redress:  
25 (6): A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(9): Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
This means that the government must come up with a law that will give people the legal and 
practical ability to reclaim or defend their ownership, occupation, use of and access to land. 
The government has so far been unable to realise the promises enshrined in Section 25 (6) 
in relation to the former Bantustans. While laws to promote tenure security for farm dwellers 
and labour tenants have been enacted, there is no legislation beyond the Interim Protection 
of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) to secure the land rights of the estimated 16.5 million 
people living in the former Bantustans. IPILRA was introduced in 1996 as a temporary 
solution that would protect people living in communal areas from being deprived of their land 




The government framed the Communal Land Rights Act (CLaRA) as legislation that would 
help people secure their land rights. The law was enacted in 2004. However, as many rural 
people argued, the CLaRA in fact would have undermined their security of land tenure 
because it gave traditional councils (tribal authorities under apartheid) wide-ranging powers, 
including control over the occupation, use and administration of communal land. It therefore 
bypassed all other forms and levels of authority related to land – elected and customary.  
 
After a lot of opposition from rural people, the Constitutional Court struck down the CLaRA in 
its entirety in 2010.  
 
 
THE NEW COMMUNAL LAND TENURE POLICY (CLTP) 
 
The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) introduced its new 
Communal Land Tenure Policy (CLTP) at a workshop hosted by the DRDLR’s parliamentary 
portfolio committee on August 23rd-24th, 2013. The DRDLR plans to create a piece of 
legislation based on the CLTP. To fully understand the CLTP, one must read it together with 




particular, the State Land Lease & Disposal Policy applies to most of the same land as the 
CLTP but says different things. It seems the two policies were written independently of each 
other, which causes a lot of confusion. 
The CLTP contains many contradictions and confusing statements. On the one hand, it sets 
out a nuanced history of land tenure insecurity in South Africa, and states an impressive 
vision for improvements. But on the other hand the solutions proposed in the same policy 
document speak neither to this nuanced history nor to the vision proposed. Examples of 
these contradictions are described throughout this factsheet. 
 
WAGON WHEEL MODEL – LAND OWNERSHIP & DECISION-MAKING POWER 
Most communal land land in the former Bantustans is registered in the name of the state.  
The Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform holds this land in trust on behalf of the 
people who use and occupy it.. The CLTP envisions that ownership of communal land will 
move from the government to traditional councils.  In theory the policy provides that land 
outside the former Bantustans may be transferred to CPAs and Trusts. This is articulated in 
two “wagon wheel” diagrams in the CLTP. The first wagon wheel (Figure 2(a)) speaks to a 
context where traditional councils “operate” and the second wheel (Figure 2(b)) where CPAs 
“operate”. There are a number of problems with the wagon wheels, which will be explained 
below. 
The CLTP also proposes that the government retains the “ultimate authority” to make 
decisions about “land rights and land use in communal areas”. This power is exercised at a 
practical level by municipalities. However, since land ownership and decision-making power 
of land go hand-in-hand, this proposal for the government to make decisions around land 
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Wagon wheel 2(a) shows that land titles (marked by the “outer boundary” of the wheel) will 
be transferred to traditional councils. Once a traditional council is in possession of the title, 
ownership will vest exclusively in the council. The CLTP therefore proposes that traditional 
councils and traditional leaders should play the role of owners and managers of land. At the 
same time it excludes countervailing structures like Communal Property Associations 
(CPAs), trusts and household level role-players from land ownership and the power to make 
decisions about land.  
The CLTP acknowledges that traditional leaders were imposed on people under colonialism 
and apartheid, and there is “much tension concerning the role of traditional leadership 
institutions in land administration” (p. 27). But the CLTP’s wagon wheel in Figure 2(a) 
contradicts this acknowledgement.  
CPAs and Trusts 
In theory, the second wagon wheel (Figure 2(b)) provides for CPAs or trusts to own land 
titles in communal areas, with input from members (as prescribed in the CPA act and in trust 
law). However, in reality this is very unlikely because the government is opposed to land in 
communal areas going to CPAs. This is explicit in the CLTP, which states that “registration 
of new CPAs on traditional communal tenure areas be carefully considered and principally 















The CLTP acknowledges that in the past, the government has ignored rural people’s ability 
to make decisions about land (p. 6). But the CLTP then goes on to propose that rural 
people’s roles in land management processes will be very minimal. The CLTP says that the 
responsibilities of rural people are to pay taxes, obey laws, consume goods and services, 
and vote (p. 19; 21). 
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In addition to those already discussed above, the wagon wheel involves a huge conceptual 
mistake in that it describes CPAs and traditional councils as “governance structures”. If the 
CLTP articulates traditional councils as “governance structures”, this would create a 4th level 
of government, which is unconstitutional.  The Constitution provides for only three levels of 
government - national, provincial and local – all of them elected. At other points the CLTP 
states that the government will delegate certain governance responsibilities to traditional 
councils (i.e. they do not have inherent governance powers) (p. 13). So the CLTP is 
uncertain about whether traditional councils are governance structures or not.  
Furthermore the CPA Act (1996) states that CPAs were established specifically to enable 
groups to own land as legal entities. They were never intended to play a governance role 
and it is unfair to expect them to do so. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF GIVING LAND TO TRADITIONAL COUNCILS 
 
In terms of customary land allocation, the traditional leader generally distributed land parcels 
to headmen who, in turn, distributed the land to households! 
In order to reconstitute the deteriorated accountability of traditional community structures to 
the communities and households they service as found in original forms of African tenure, 
the “Wagon Wheel model” for communal tenure reform, emphasizes that, these institutions 
are responsible for land administration as outer boundary title holders.  
Communal Land Tenure Policy, August 24, pp. 18-19 
On the basis of the white paper on traditional leadership and governance the CLTP places 
traditional leaders at the centre of questions of land management (p. 8). The CLTP proposes 
that it will solve the problem of insecurity of land tenure and unaccountable land 
management structures by transferring land titles to traditional councils (p. 17). However, the 
CLTP gives no explanation as to how this proposal will solve these problems, especially in 
the context of rural people expressing wide-spread resistance to traditional councils as land 
holding institutions in the context of the CLaRA. 
The CLTP assumes that all ‘customary’ land is the preserve of traditional councils, and that 
democratic structures can exist only outside the former Bantustans (p. 12; 13). It states that: 
Land shall be administered by traditional councils in areas that observe customary law, or 
communal property institutions outside these (emphasis added) (p. 12)! 
The administrative responsibilities associated with communal area land rests with traditional 
leadership councils in areas that observe customary law, or CPAs or Trusts outside of these 
areas (emphasis added) (pp. 21). 
The CLTP reserves communal land for control by traditional councils, while CPAs and other 
structures are expected to operate only outside of communal areas. This repeats one of the 
central assumptions and problems of the CLaRA - that customary land tenure exists only 
with and under the control of chiefs. Historical evidence shows this to be false.  
 
PROPOSALS FOR PROVIDING SECURITY OF LAND TENURE 
&"
"
The CLTP ignores the fact that the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) 
provides people with a number of legal protections against being deprived of their land. 
Instead of building on IPILRA, it tries to ‘reinvent’ the wheel by creating protections that 
already exist in IPILRA. For example, the CLTP aims to “prevent the loss of land by 
communal area inhabitants” and allow people to “reserve the right of first refusal” (paragraph 
2.7., p. 16). Meanwhile, IPILRA already provides that “no person may be deprived of any 
informal right to land without his or her consent” (Section 2.1). 
 
Moreover the CLTP and the Rural Development Framework recognise informal rights1 to 
land on much narrower basis than under IPILRA. Unlike IPILRA, it works on the basis of a 
“hierarchy” of rights, where “use rights” are viewed as the lowest form of rights. In this way, it 
weakens rather than strengthens people’s security of tenure.  
The CLTP marks a major step backwards from IPILRA in terms of its land compensation 
provisions. The CLTP states that households will only be compensated for “land-related 
investments rather than the land itself” (p. 21). This means people will only receive 
compensation for their “investments” (for example, houses on the land) and not for the value 
of the land, and the land’s use and occupation benefits.  IPILRA, on the other hand, provides 
for compensation for these other factors when people are deprived of land. 
 
GOING FORWARD 
The Constitution’s section on property was controversial when it was written because it 
entrenched existing property rights. But, to balance this, it also obligated the government to 
devise provisions that would remedy the country’s legacy of inequitable distribution of land. 
Thus balancing rights to restitution, access to land, and tenure security were included. By 
failing to give effect to these balancing obligations, the government risks betraying people 
living in rural areas as well as the principles of the Constitution and the protections it sought 
to introduce.  
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1 Informal rights to land include those who use, occupy or access land in terms of: customary laws and practices; 
beneficial occupation; land vested in the SADT, or the governments of the former homelands, or any other kind of 
trust established by statute; or any person who is the holder of a right in land in terms of the Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act but who was not formally recorded as such in the register of land rights. 
